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Zusammenfassung 
Zuwanderung aus Ländern von außerhalb Europas oder außerhalb der Europäischen 
Union steht vielfach auf der politischen Tagesordnung: entweder, um (qualifizierte) 
Arbeitskräfte anzuwerben oder aber angesichts eines nicht erwünschten Zustroms von 
Migranten. Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit Auswirkungen von Migration auf 
soziale Sicherung, sowohl auf soziale Sicherungssysteme als auch auf die soziale 
Sicherung von Personen. Die Auswirkungen können je nach Zweig des sozialen 
Sicherungssystems (Gesundheit, Alter usw.) und ihrer jeweiligen Struktur recht 
unterschiedlich sein. Migrationsprozesse können auch makroökonomische Variable 
beeinflussen (was relevant z. B. für die Finanzierung sozialer Sicherungssysteme ist) 
wie auch die soziale Situation von „Einheimischen“. In diesem Beitrag wird 
ausschließlich die Situation in den Zuwanderungsländern betrachtet und hierbei ein 
Überblick über verschiedene Dimensionen dieses hochkomplexen Themenfeldes 
gegeben.  
Der Beitrag ist wie folgt strukturiert: Am Beginn stehen Bemerkungen zur 
Terminologie, die Probleme aufwirft (2). Sodann werden als ein Einflussfaktor einige 
demographische Daten herangezogen, die für die Zuwanderung von außerhalb der EU 
neben anderen Einflussfaktoren von Bedeutung sind (3). Danach werden ausgewählte 
Aspekte im Hinblick auf Struktur und Eigenschaften von Migrationen aufgeführt, die 
für soziale Sicherung relevant sind (4). Soziale Sicherung ist oft eng verknüpft mit der 
Integration von Migranten in den Arbeitsmarkt. Deshalb wird dies als Nächstes erörtert 
(5), bevor im Hauptteil des Beitrags auf Auswirkungen von Migration auf 
Alterssicherung, das Gesundheitswesen und auf bedürftigkeitsgeprüfte 
Transferzahlungen eingegangen wird (6). Da diese Effekte zum erheblichen Teil 
maßgebend von den jeweiligen institutionellen Regelungen beeinflusst werden, wird zur 
Illustration die Situation in Deutschland im Vergleich zu Spanien (wo dies möglich ist) 
herangezogen. Schließlich werden einige vorläufige Schlussfolgerungen im Hinblick 
auf die im Titel des Beitrags gestellte Frage gezogen. 
Um Antworten über Auswirkungen von Migration insbesondere aus Ländern außerhalb 
der EU oder von außerhalb Europas zu geben, sind – wie oft in der Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialpolitik – Längsschnittdaten erforderlich, um mit ihnen z. B. kohortenspezifische 
Unterschiede und Entwicklungen zu identifizieren. Auch ist die Heterogenität von 
Migranten angemessen zu berücksichtigen. Im Hinblick auf die anzustrebende 
Migrationspolitik werden einige Zweifel im Hinblick auf eine Strategie formuliert, die 
auf eine vergleichsweise kurzfristige Zuwanderung ausgerichtet ist (wie sie dem 
Konzept einer „blue card“ in der EU zugrunde liegt).  
Summary 
Immigration from outside Europe (or outside the EU) is on the political agenda, either 
by looking for (qualified) labour or because of unintended inflow of migrants. The 
focus of this paper is on effects of migration on social security – on social security 
schemes as well as on social security of persons. These effects can differ according to 
the branch of social security (health, old age etc.) and its institutional design (its 
structure). It can affect also macroeconomic variables relevant for social security 
financing as well as social security of natives.  
In this paper only effects regarding migration in the receiving country (the “host 
country”) are discussed, trying to give an overview on several dimensions of this very 
complex topic. 
The paper is structured as follows: Starting with a few remarks on terminology focused 
on immigrants (2), some demographic data are mentioned as one element of factors 
influencing migration from outside the EU beside other push and pull factors for 
migration (3). Then some aspects regarding structure and characteristics of immigrants 
are mentioned that seem to be relevant for social security (4). Social security often is 
closely linked to integration into the labour market. This will be discussed (5), before 
some effects on old-age security as well as on the health sector and means-tested 
benefits are dealt with in the main part of the paper (6). Because such effects much 
depend on institutional rules, this will be mainly illustrated by comparing Germany to 
Spain (where this is possible). Finally there will be some tentative conclusions 
regarding the title of this paper (7).  
In order to answer questions about the effects of migration in particular from outside the 
EU or outside Europe, longitudinal data are required – as often in economic and social 
policy –, trying to identify, for example, cohort-specific differences and developments 
and taking into consideration the heterogeneity of migrants. Regarding the question on 
the appropriate migration policy there are some doubts that a focus on intended 
relatively short-term migration may be successful or adequate. 
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1 Introduction 
The need for migrant workers because of economic or demographic reasons, but also a 
fear of overburdening a society (because of integration) or national social security 
schemes, these are topics that are not new at all. The main focus of the public 
discussion, however, changed over time. Sometimes migration is seen as a chance for 
social security to reduce financing pressure in ageing societies, sometimes as a burden, 
when migrants receive more benefits than they contribute to their financing.  
How timely this topic is, was underlined recently when EU-commissioner Frattini 
announced a new approach of the commission to make the countries of the European 
Union attractive for highly qualified migrants, proposing “blue-cards” (European 
Commission 2007). It is argued that highly qualified migrants will be needed in the 
future because of the ageing and shrinking population in the EU. Already now there is a 
lack of qualified manpower in some branches of industry in some countries. Working 
permits and conditions as well as social security are in the centre of this line of thinking. 
A selection of immigrants according to the benefit of the receiving (host) country1 is 
intended, because – as experience shows – not only high-skilled people want to 
immigrate into countries of the EU. Whether this selection will be successful, is an open 
question. 
The European Union itself has become larger and larger over time. Therefore, part of 
the immigration that was a few years ago migration from outside the Union is now 
mobility within the union.2 For example, the official inflow of Polish people into 
Germany jumped from 74 000 to 125 000 after Poland became a member country 
(Overview 1). Maybe part of this increase is a change from undocumented to official 
inflow. 
                                                 
1 Particularly in Germany, the expression “host country” – which is widely used – may remind us of 
the period of recruiting “guest workers” in times of shortage of manpower with low qualification. 
A more neutral expression can be seen in “(migration) receiving country”. Both expressions are 
used in this article.  
2 For effects of EU-enlargement on social security see Schmähl (2004). 
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Overview 1: Inflow of foreign nationals into Germany 
    – in thousand – 
2000 2004 from 
total in per cent1) total in per cent1) 
Poland 74 100 11.4 125 000 20.8 
Turkey2) 49 100 7.6 42 600 7.1 
1) in per cent of total inflow 
2) outflow of Turkish nationals in 2000: 39 000 (ratio of outflow to  
inflow = 70.4 per cent) 
Source: OECD (2006) and own calculations.  
But there is also migration from countries with different cultural and economic 
background from outside the European Union – but not necessarily from outside Europe 
as also can be seen from Overview 1. 
Migration processes had and have different quantitative importance in different 
countries, and also the direction of the migration process can change from net 
emigration to net immigration as in Spain: Spain now has the highest inflow of 
immigrants per year of all countries of the European Union. A few years ago, the 
situation was quite different (Overview 2). The fact that Spain is a EU-border country 
may be one reason for this development, but there are also other reasons – among them 
are effects of history and language.  
Overview 2: Inflow of foreign population into selected countries of the EU 
     – in thousand – 
 2000 1999 2004 
Spain 
Germany  
UK 
Italy 
330.9 
648.8 
379.3 
271.5 
99.1 
673.9 
337.4 
268.0 
645.8 
602.2 
494.1 
319.3 
Source: OECD (2006: 233). 
The figures in these as well as in other Overviews in this paper, however, only cover 
legal and not illegal migration. The term migration covers immigration, but also 
emigration – return migration is part of it. 
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Migration affects social security in various ways (Overview 3), it affects 
- social security schemes as well as 
- social security of persons. 
Overview 3 
 
Migration
immigration emigration 
social security schemes 
 
social 
insurance 
 
public 
budget 
 
private 
and firm-
based 
social security of persons 
 
 
foreign nationals
 
 
natives 
effects on
? 
 
Source: Own chart. 
The effects may differ according to the branch of social security and its design, they are 
influenced also by characteristics of migrants and whether and how they are integrated 
into the labour market. Immigration can affect natives as well and also macroeconomic 
variables and thereby social security schemes.3  
These few remarks already illustrate the fact that an analysis of the influence of 
immigration on social security has to take into consideration a great number of different 
aspects and dimensions. Only some of those effects resulting from immigration in the 
receiving country are discussed here, neglecting effects that may take place in the 
sending countries, where immigrants come from.4 An overview on several dimensions 
                                                 
3 There may be direct effects, for example, resulting from social law and tax rules, but also indirect 
effects transmitted by macroeconomic effects like wages or employment which are influenced by 
immigration. 
4 This is another very complex topic. It was pointed out recently that remittances (money transfers 
from migrants to their home country) are meanwhile the biggest part of inflowing capital, higher 
than all financing of development aid, see Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2007). The balance 
of payment statistics even undercounts these transfers between migrants and families because 
sometimes other (informal) channels and methods are used beside the formal financial system, 
see, for example, World Bank 2006.  
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of this highly complex topic shall be given, mainly from an economic point of view, 
without going into technical details. Empirical data shall only illustrate some of the 
relevant dimensions.  
The paper is structured as follows: Starting with a few remarks on terminology focused 
on immigrants (2), some demographic data are mentioned as one element of factors 
influencing migration from outside the EU beside other push and pull factors for 
migration (3) Then some aspects regarding structure and characteristics of immigrants 
are mentioned that seem to be relevant for social security (4). Social security often is 
closely linked to integration into the labour market. This will be discussed next (5) 
before some effects on old-age security as well as on the health sector and means-tested 
benefits are dealt with in the main part of the paper (6). Because such effects depend 
much on institutional rules, this will be mainly illustrated by taking Germany as an 
example, contrasting it with Spain where possible. Finally there will be some tentative 
conclusions regarding the title of this paper (7).  
2 Who is an “immigrant”?5 
Unfortunately, the term “immigrant” is used in different meanings, it also differs often 
from country to country and is therefore in different ways conceptualised for collecting 
empirical data.6 It is useful to make a distinction between new immigrants coming into a 
country in one year (the flow dimension) and the stock of all immigrants living in the 
country. 
Regarding the flow dimension, statistics often mention only “net migration”, that means 
the balance of the number of immigrants and emigrants. For example, in 2005 about 
400 000 foreign persons came to Germany, but also 290 000 foreign nationals were 
leaving the country.7 If the structure of inflow and outflow differs, this can have several 
economic effects which may be relevant for social security, for example, how old they 
are and whether they were employed and how much they earn.  
An immigrant is a person who changed residence across borders, and with regard to 
this, mostly a distinction is made between “foreign-born” and natives. But if we take 
into account that, for example, a German now living in Germany may be born in Spain, 
it is useful to distinguish between foreign-born citizens and foreign-born foreign 
nationals. 
The number of foreign-born citizens is important in particular for social insurance in 
                                                 
5 This paragraph is based in part on Vogel and Triandafyllidou (2006: 9-14). See also OECD 
(2006).  
6 The term “migrant” sometimes is a generic term, or only means short-term migration, “immigrant” 
in particular in US-publications often is used for long-term migration. 
7 From Overview 1 it can be seen that the ratio of outflow of Turkish nationals from Germany 
compared to the inflow was 70 % in the year 2000, that means, while 100 Turkish nationals came 
to Germany, 70 persons returned to Turkey.  
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Germany, because ethnic Germans, who mainly came from Poland and Romania in the 
beginning and later from the Soviet Union, are treated according to German law in 
social insurance as if they always were members, for example, of the German social 
pension insurance scheme.8 
Immigrants with personal migration experience often are called “first generation 
immigrants”, while their children, born in the receiving country or having entered the 
country together with their parents, are called “second generation immigrants”. 
Characteristics and behaviour of parents as well as of their children are relevant for 
social security considerations. 
In Germany, the officially used (and as politically correct labelled) term for all those 
persons with personal migration experience or being their offspring meanwhile is 
“persons with migration background”.  
The stock of foreign nationals can change from year to year, not only because persons 
immigrate and emigrate during the year, but also because of naturalisation. That means: 
Not all immigrants are foreigners. The rules for naturalisation sometimes change over 
time, so that, for example, a greater number of former foreign nationals become citizens 
of the receiving country. This will change statistical information about foreigners living 
in the country.  
In French statistics, a distinction is made between foreign-born foreign nationals, 
foreign-born citizens and native-born citizens. In Germany, only the distinction between 
citizens (whether native- or foreign-born) and foreign nationals (aliens) is normally 
used. But the difference in the share of foreign-born persons and foreign nationals in 
Germany is remarkable: In 2005 it was estimated (see Overview 4) that 12.6 per cent of 
the total population living in Germany were foreign-born persons, while 8.9 per cent 
were foreign nationals. To make the picture even more complex: About 1.7 million of 
Germany’s 7.3 million foreign nationals were already born in Germany (that is nearly 
one quarter) and have not yet been naturalised. 
                                                 
8 Another illustration of the complexity is for example the change of borders after the Second 
World War as well as the state formation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, the 
reestablishment of the three Baltic states.  
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Overview 4: Foreign-Born and Foreign Nationals in Germany (2005) 
– in thousand and in per cent of total population – 
 foreign-born  
(immigrants) 
native  
(born in Germany) 
total 
foreign 
national 
5 572 1 749 
(= offsprings of immigrants 
without German citizenship, 
“second” and “third 
generation”) 
7 321 
(8.9 %) 
citizen 4 827 
(= ethnic Germans, 
naturalized immigrants,  
children of emigrated 
Germans) 
70 317 
(= persons born in Germany 
with German citizenship; among 
them those with “migration 
background”, i.e. one parent or 
both parents born abroad or 
foreign citizens: 3 185)1) 
75 144 
(91.1 %) 
total 10 399 (12.6 %) 72 066 (87.4 %) 82 465 
(100 %) 
1) Among them persons without “migration background”, i. e. both parents born in 
Germany (67 132). 
Source: Calculations by Dita Vogel, based on Mikrozensus 2005, Table-annex to 
Migrationsbericht (2007: 211). 
In Germany, the term persons “with migration background” has been officially used for 
a short time, but covers quite different groups – persons or their parents being foreign-
born or having a foreign citizenship or did so in the past. If this definition is used, 
nearly 19 per cent (15.3 million) of the population in Germany have had a “migration 
background” in 2005,9 but about half of them (8 million persons) are German citizens, 
while the others are foreigners.10 
3 Immigration from outside the European Union – 
push and pull factors 
In particular in countries where the economy is booming, sometimes limits of the 
production capacity may exist because of a lack of manpower. This can be an important 
pull-factor for migration (of unskilled and low-skilled workers or – on the contrary – of 
                                                 
9 This can be calculated from Overview 4: Foreign-born persons (10 399) + foreign nationals born 
in Germany (1 749) + citizens born in Germany with “migration background” (3 185). See also 
Statistisches Bundesamt (2006) and Aldashev et al. (2007).  
10 5 572 + 1 749 (see Overview 4). 
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high-skilled professionals). And in countries with an ageing (or even shrinking) 
population one possibility to soften financing problems in social security often is seen 
in immigration of young foreigners. It is, however, necessary that they can be integrated 
into the labour market. Labour market pulls therefore may be caused by an ageing – or 
even shrinking – population. 
On the other hand, an important push factor is arising from rapid population growth in 
countries of other parts of the world and from existing great differences in economic 
well-being as well as economic insecurity and political instability. Sometimes, it is even 
feared that the generosity of social security arrangements in a country – for example the 
level of social assistance or the quality of treatment in the health sector – is attracting 
migrants.11  
The population development (for example of the last 55 years) as well as the new 
population projection of the UN for the next 45 years illustrate the potential push effect 
due to the tremendous differences in population development – although assumptions of 
population projections always may be disputed (Overview 5).12 
Overview 5: Population Development 
 2007 2050* 
 in million increase since 
1950 
– in per cent –
in million change since 
2007 
– in per cent – 
Africa 
Asia 
Europe 
Latin America and 
the Carribean 
North America 
Oceania 
965 
4 030 
731 
 
572 
339 
34 
331 
186 
33 
 
240 
97 
162 
1 998 
5 266 
644 
 
769 
445 
49 
107 
31 
-9 
 
34 
31 
44 
World 6 671 163 9 191 38 
* Medium variant of population projection 
Source: United Nations (2007), Table 1 and own calculations.  
While in Africa the population growth rate between 1950 and 2007 was 331 per cent 
and up to 2050 another doubling of the population number is calculated, for Europe on 
the contrary even a reduction in the total number of people is projected over the next 45 
years according to the medium variant of the UN – Europe will be the only region of the 
world with on average a shrinking population (although there exist differences between 
European countries). 
                                                 
11 It is, however, also argued that empirical data give no firm conclusion on this, probably the strong 
effects are not likely, as concluded by Bauer (2002).  
12 These figures are based also on migration assumptions. 
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The share of elderly people (60 years and older) in the total population in all regions of 
the world will rise – a world-wide process of population ageing (Overview 6). 
According to the calculations of the UN the rate of growth of this share differs 
remarkably (with Latin America and Asia at the top, see last column of Overview 6), 
but the level of the share remains the highest in Europe (second column).  
Overview 6: Elderly persons (60+) in per cent of total population 2005 and 2050 
 2005 2050 
(UN medium 
variant) 
 
 – in per cent – increase since 2005 
– in per cent – 
Africa 
Asia 
Europe 
Latin America and the 
Carribean 
North America 
Oceania 
5.2 
9.2 
20.6 
 
9.0 
16.7 
14.1 
10.4 
23.7 
34.5 
 
24.3 
27.3 
24.8 
100 
158 
67 
 
170 
63 
76 
World 10.3 21.8 112 
Source:  United Nations (2007), Table 2 and own calculations.  
It is calculated that in 2050 more than one third of the population in Europe will be 60 
years and older. And the ratio of the very old (80 years and older) will increase in 
Europe even faster, namely from 3.5 per cent in 2005 to 9.6 per cent in 2050. That is an 
increase of about 175 per cent. Although this is only a counting of heads, it nevertheless 
illustrates, for example, the importance of a changing age structure for sectors like 
health care and, in particular, long-term care in Europe.  
For the next 45 years, the UN expect major streams of net migration also towards 
Europe (Overview 7). Countries of the European Union experience already today 
migration pressure from Africa and Latin America (in particular to southern Europe) as 
well as from countries at the eastern border of the EU (in particular to Central European 
member countries). This means legal, but also illegal immigration, which is, in general, 
not or not adequately documented in statistics. A recent study estimates that 20 per cent 
of official and undocumented foreign nationals participate in the informal sector, where 
they do not contribute to and have very limited access to social security.13 
                                                 
13 Holzmann et al. (2005: 64). 
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Overview 7: Major net receivers of international migrants 
UN projection assumptions, average per year 2005-2050 
 in thousand per year 
US 
Canada 
1 100 
200 
Germany  
Italy  
UK 
Spain 
150 
139 
130 
123 
Australia 100 
Source: United Nations (2007), Table 1 or 2, p. 13. 
If we look at two major sending countries for non-EU immigrants – namely Morocco 
and Turkey – we can see that most of the official migrants go to a few number of 
countries: About 80 per cent of official migrants from Morocco who live in Europe are 
in France, Spain and Italy, and nearly three quarters of Turkish people living outside 
their country in Europe are in Germany (Overview 8). This brings us immediately to the 
next question: Who is immigrating?  
Overview 8: Official migrants in 2000 from Morocco and Turkey in 3 major 
European  
receiving countries 
 Morocco  Turkey 
 in 1 000 in per cent  in 1 000 in per cent 
World 
Europe 
1 255 
1 082 
100.0 
86.2 
 
100.0 
World 
Europe 
2 789 
2 692 
100.0 
96.5 
 
100.0 
 France 
 Spain 
 Italy 
504 
200 
160 
 46.6 
18.5 
14.8 
Germany 
France 
Austria 
1 999 
298 
136 
 74.0 
7.7 
5.1 
Source: Holzmann et al. (2005), Tab. 15 and 23 and own calculations. 
4 Status, structure and characteristics of immigrants and their 
relevance for social security 
Figures regarding migration only show the number of persons. However, immigrants 
are not at all a homogeneous group. This is highly significant also for social security. 
Looking at structural elements that are important for effects on social security, it is in 
particular the structure of the family beside age and sex of immigrants and – regarding 
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the possibility to be integrated into the labour market – health conditions, skills and 
ability to understand and speak the language of the receiving country (Overview 9). 
Having free mobility within the European Union, the status of immigrants from outside 
the EU is important, particularly the category of entry and the access to the labour 
market as well as to political and social rights. Remarkable changes often take place 
here over time: A country looking for rotating “guest workers” – that is more or less 
short-term immigrants – may be forced sooner or later, for example, to regulate family 
unification. The perception of the receiving country, that migrants will come only for a 
relatively short period of their life, may not be reality in the end, temporary migrants 
may become long-term or even permanent immigrants (Overview 9). This can be 
illustrated by taking Germany as an example: A substantial part of recruited workers 
between 1955 and 1973 in Germany brought families with them and finally considered 
Germany as their new country of residence. Since the end of the recruitment of workers 
(in times of the first oil-price shock and its economic effects), the migration process was 
not any more dominated by labour migration but by family unification. This also 
changed the mix of sexes. Many of the new migrants at that time were not immediately 
allowed to work officially. While during the period of recruitment of “guest workers” 
the labour force participation rate of foreign nationals was higher than the participation 
rate of citizens, it later dropped on average below the rate of citizens because of such 
restrictions. In the beginning, mainly workers from Italy, Spain and Greece were 
recruited, later on more and more came from Yugoslavia and Turkey. The “guest 
workers” of that time often were relatively low-skilled. When unemployment increased 
in Germany in the 1980s, the unemployment rate of migrants increased, too, affecting in 
particular migrants from Turkey and Yugoslavia, while many workers recruited from 
EU countries – like Italy and Spain – had already returned to their country of origin, 
where economic conditions had improved meanwhile. 
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Overview 9 
Status of immigrants 
 
Structure and characteristics of 
immigrants 
from EU-countries or from outside EU  
by category of entry: 
 long-term  
 work  
 accompanying family workers 
 family unification or formation  
 asylum seekers and refugees 
 temporary  
 students  
 seasonal workers  
 intra-company transfers  
  
 
age  
sex 
family structure 
health conditions (morbidity) 
qualification (skill level) 
languages  
legal rules (e.g. naturalisation)     fertility  
            mortality  
            human capital investment  
 
       changes over time   
Source: Own chart. 
For those staying long-term or permanent it is also relevant, how fertility behaviour, 
mortality and morbidity or investment decisions regarding human capital develop over 
time. This is, among other things, relevant for labour market participation, income, 
accumulation of pension claims and so on. Other types of entry are relevant, as well: 
refugees14 and asylum seekers or seasonal workers, affecting social security schemes in 
different ways.  
Regarding social security schemes, characteristics of migrants and their integration into 
the labour market as dependent workers or as self-employed persons are relevant 
(Overview 10), but as well the effects of migration on employment, unemployment and 
income of natives. The fact, whether migrant workers are supplements or substitutes for 
native workers, is decisive for the effects on employment and wages of natives and on 
social security schemes, on revenue as well as on the claims for social security benefits. 
It is obvious that migration therefore can influence macroeconomic variables like sum 
of wages, average wages, number of employed and unemployed. All this affects 
revenue and expenditure in various branches of social security, depending on the 
specific rules of social and tax law. Beside different branches of social insurance also 
                                                 
14 German data illustrate, how numbers can change: In 1995, there were 167 000 asylum seekers 
(more than in the United States, 149 000), while in 2004 the number dropped by 75 per cent to 
less than 36 000; OECD (2006: 256 and 258).  
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public budgets providing benefits in cash or in kind have to be taken into account as 
well as effects on private and firm-based social security: Are immigrants for example 
integrated in occupational pension schemes, will they receive vested claims – this will 
depend on the length of the vesting period as well as the length of employment with the 
firm. Are immigrants able and willing to save voluntarily, for example, for old age? 
This is also relevant if migrants stay in the host country after retirement. Will they have 
enough money to finance their living or do they need means-tested social assistance to a 
higher degree than natives? 
Overview 10: Migration and Social Security 
 
Source: Own chart. 
For social security of the persons as well as the institutions, the integration of migrants 
into the labour market is of utmost importance because contribution and tax revenue as 
well as the integration into occupational (firm-based) pension schemes are linked 
hereto. 
5 Immigrants and their integration into the labour market 
Whether immigrants from outside the EU are allowed to work in the official economy is 
based on country-specific rules regarding the status of entry. And how official 
immigrants are covered in particular by social insurance, this is based on bilateral 
agreements between states. For effects on social security, the integration into the official 
sector of the economy is decisive. If immigrants are not allowed to work, means-tested 
 
International 
Migration 
(immigrant, 
emigrants) 
   - number 
   - structure 
   - origin 
integration into
labour market  
- dependent workers
- self-employed 
effects on  
- employment 
- income 
- shadow economy 
Social Security 
 
 
 
revenue 
 
expenditure
(transfers in 
cash and in 
kind) 
social insurance  
- old-age and disability 
- health and long-term care 
- unemployment 
- workplace accident 
public budgets  
(federal, state, local) 
- social assistance  
- family cash benefits  
- other transfers  
private and firm-based  
social security provision 
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transfer payments may become necessary to finance the living of these persons or this is 
financed by family members. 
Beside the official economy, also the shadow sector (informal economy) has to be 
considered. Here, legally as well as illegally immigrated persons can be engaged beside 
natives. Empirical information on this is – as always when shadow activities are 
involved – rather limited. 
Looking, for example, at the share of foreign-born persons in Germany and Spain in 
total official employment, this percentage has been rather stable in Germany during the 
last years (here 1994-2004), while a remarkable increase has taken place in Spain 
during the last years (Overview 11).15 
Overview 11: Official Employment 
 Germany 
(average) 
Spain 
(average) 
 1994-95 2003-04 1994-95 2003-04 
Total (in thousand) 
Foreign-born (in thousand) 
37 593 
4 199 
35 273 
4 038 
12 221 
273 
17 441 
1 752 
Foreign-born (in per cent of total) 11 11 2 10 
Source: OECD (2006: 52). 
It is not astonishing that employment rates increase according to the level of education, 
while unemployment rates decrease (Overview 12). However, comparing Spain and 
Germany, employment rates of foreign-born persons were higher and unemployment 
rates were lower in Spain than in Germany in 2003-2004 and the differences according 
to education levels in Spain were not so pronounced as in Germany – reflecting the 
present better economic conditions in Spain. The low employment rate of foreign-born 
persons with low level of education in Germany compared to Spain can be a result of 
the different family structure in both countries and reflects also the history of migration 
– in Germany after the recruitment of guest workers, family unification as status of 
entry was important, presumably more important than up to now in Spain, where the big 
                                                 
15 The structure of employment by branch of industry differs between the two countries and can be 
relevant for wages. While in Germany employment in mining and manufacturing is highest (32 
per cent) and about 22 per cent in non-specified services, in Spain foreign-born persons are 
distributed more equally over several branches, with construction at the top. The high rate of 
foreigners employed in hotels and restaurants is not astonishing and there is also a high 
percentage of foreign employees in private households. This is scarcely the case in Germany – at 
least regarding official employment. But only this is relevant for claims, for example, in social 
insurance.  
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wave of working immigrants is a recent phenomenon.16 As mentioned by the OECD for 
Portugal, “movements for new migration countries tend to be heavily work-based in the 
early stages”, while “ancestry-based migration is prominent in Germany […]”.17 
Integration of migrants into the labour market is, therefore, also influenced by the 
migration history of a country. 
Overview 12: Employment and unemployment rates of native- and  
foreign-born population by level of education, 2003-04 
(Germany and Spain) – in per cent – 
 Germany Spain 
Employment rate 
Natives 
 low 
 medium 
 high 
Foreign-born 
 low 
 medium 
 high 
 
 
40.2 
69.1 
84.5 
 
45.1 
62.4 
68.1 
 
 
53.4 
60.2 
79.5 
 
61.2 
68.9 
73.2 
Unemployment rate 
Natives 
 low 
 medium 
 high 
Foreign-born 
 low 
 medium 
 high 
 
 
15.6 
10.4 
4.4 
 
20.3 
14.7 
12.5 
 
 
12.6 
11.1 
7.9 
 
15.3 
13.0 
11.9 
Source: OECD (2006), Tab. I.10. 
For Germany, it can be seen that male migrants are relatively well integrated into the 
labour market, while this does not apply in particular to women from Turkey.18 There 
also existed some barriers for labour market entry for migrant spouses, which 
meanwhile have been abolished (when a new migration law came into force in 2005). A 
specific problem exists in Germany for “second generation migrants” because of low 
skill levels.19 
                                                 
16 However, these statistical information have to considered with some caution because, for 
example, for Germany there exists “a clear need for statistics based on the country of birth” 
(Liebig 2007: 4). 
17 OECD (2006: 35). 
18 See also Liebig (2007). 
19 For details see OECD (2005). 
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Turning to effects of immigration for social security, the specific institutional rules are 
decisive. Regarding some empirical findings, it is referred to one country, Germany.20 
6 Migrants from outside the EU and social security 
6.1 Structure and concept of social security – some general remarks 
Effects on social security schemes as well as on individual social security depend, 
among other things, on the structure and concept of social security, whether, for 
example, it is a citizen-based general scheme (tax-financed) or a social insurance 
scheme based on claims which are acquired – in particular by contribution payments – 
during the working life. For social insurance schemes it is important, whether the level 
of the benefits is depending on the level of contribution payment respectively the 
income as the base of the contribution payment (as in social insurance pension schemes) 
or whether the benefit is not linked to the level of individual contribution payment as in 
the case of benefits in kind, dominating for example the German health care insurance. 
6.2 Migrants from outside the EU and German social security 
If we look at registered foreign nationals in Germany at the end of the year 2005, 80 per 
cent were from Europe – but only 32 per cent from EU-member countries, Italy and 
Poland at the top (Overview 13). But although the enlargement of the EU has taken 
place particularly towards Central and Eastern Europe, nevertheless 48 per cent of all 
foreign nationals are from other European countries – by far most of them from Turkey 
– and only 20 per cent from non-European countries. Migration from outside Europe 
and from outside the EU may have a different impact on social security.21  
                                                 
20 Meanwhile, there are publications focused on the development of migration policy and its link to 
welfare arrangements, taking Germany as an example in a comparative view (see Guiraudon 2000 
and Sainsbury 2006). In this paper, the focus is on effects for social security in the migrant-
receiving countries. 
21 If, for example, the focus is on different cultural backgrounds, this obviously does not only refer 
to migrants from outside Europe. 
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Overview 13: Foreign nationals in Germany –December 31, 2005 
From in million in per cent 
Europe  
 European Union  
 Italy  
 Poland 
 Other European countries 
 Turkey 
 Serbia and Montenegro 
5.38 
2.14 
0.54 
0.33 
3.23 
1.76 
0.30 
80 
32 
8 
5 
48 
26 
4 
Non-European countries 
 Asia  
 Africa 
 ... 
1.38 
0.83 
0.27 
 
20 
12 
4 
 
Total   6.76*) 100 
*) About 1 million are native-born but not naturalised (Vogel and  
 Triandafyllidou 2006: 12). 
Source: Ausländerzentralregister, Cyrus and Vogel (2007: 7), rounded figures. 
6.2.1 Social pension insurance  
Particularly regarding old-age security, immigration is very often seen as a necessary 
instrument of financing pension schemes in countries with a low fertility rate (and 
increasing life expectancy). How immigration affects the financing of pension schemes, 
depends on the type of the scheme and relevant rules for financing and benefit 
calculation as well as on certain characteristics – such as age structure and health 
conditions – of migrants. When continuing to stay in the receiving country after 
retirement, the foreign national is treated like a German national.  
In general, it can be assumed that pension benefits in social insurance can be exported, 
when the insured migrant from outside the EU leaves the receiving country (return 
migration). This is normally based on (bilateral) social security agreements. Germany 
has more than 220 of such agreements.22 Regarding return migration of pensioners it is 
decisive, whether the pensioner takes residence in a country Germany has already an 
agreement with and whether the pension benefit is exported in its full amount or not. 
One example shall illustrate the rather complex and sometimes confusing situation 
(Overview 14).23 
                                                 
22 France more than 380, Spain about 140, see Holzmann et al. (2005: 69). 
23 Information are taken from Holzmann et al. (2005: 12-13). 
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Overview 14: Bilateral social security agreements – German social insurance pension 
in case of return migration 
 national from 
 Morocoo Turkey 
Tunisia 
Algeria Germany 
bilateral agreement with 
Germany 
yes1) yes2) no 
 payment of German pension 
Morocco 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Turkey  
Tunisia 
100 % 100 % 70 % 
Algeria 100 % 70 % 70 % 
 
 
 
100 % 
 
 
residence of 
pensioner 
EU 100 % 100 % 
1) nondiscrimination with regard to residence in a third country 
2) exception = excluding with regard to residence in a third country 
Source: Own chart based on information in Holzmann et al. (2005: 13). 
Morocco, for example, has a bilateral agreement with Germany, which includes a non-
discrimination clause with regard to residence. Like a German, a Moroccan receives his 
old-age pension without any reduction, independent of the country of residence.24 No 
such agreement exists with Algeria. But this does not affect the German pension of a 
Moroccan, if he lives in Algeria. The situation is different for an Algerian person, who 
has to accept a reduction from his full German pension of 30 per cent, if he lives in a 
country with which Germany has not concluded an agreement. So living in Algeria 
reduces the pension amount. But this does not apply to an Algerian person when living 
in Morocco, because Morocco has such an agreement with Germany. 
Things become even more complicated in case of Turkey and Tunisia because in these 
bilateral agreements non-discrimination with regard to residence in a third country is 
explicitly excluded. That means that a pensioner from Turkey or Tunisia residing in 
Algeria has to accept a 30 per cent reduction in contrast to a pensioner from Morocco. 
And also any national of a country with which Germany has not concluded an 
agreement (like an Algerian), who decides to live in Turkey or Tunisia also only 
receives 70 per cent of his German pension.25 
The export of pensions not only affects the income of the pensioner but also the 
financing of the pension scheme. Here, however, the contribution payments of present 
immigrants have to be considered, too (Overview 15). Immigration of persons younger 
                                                 
24 Which can – depending on the costs of living – improve real income compared, for example, to 
staying in Germany. 
25 Concerning bilateral agreements on social security see also Paparella (2004). 
 24 
than the native population reduces the old-age dependency ratio at time of immigration. 
Assuming the persons are integrated in the official labour market and are paying a 
contribution to a pay-as-you-go-financed pension scheme, the system dependency ratio 
(number of pensioners to number of contributors) will be reduced as well. 
Overview 15: Financing of Social Pension Insurance (in one year 
– some influencing factors by migration – 
(System dependency ratio) 
 
paymentoncontributiAverage
benefitpensionAverage
rscontributoofNumber
pensionersofNumber
revenueoncontributiofSum
benefitspensionofSum ⋅=
 
• age structure    • average earnings 
• mortality rate    • unemployment rate 
• labour force participation rate 
• disability probability 
• retirement behaviour 
 
     comparing migrants  
      and natives 
Source: Own chart. 
However, contributors accumulate pension claims that have to be financed in the future 
when the present contributors will retire. In general: Migration will and cannot avoid 
additional financial burden in old-age security in an ageing population like in Germany, 
because – to be realistic – migration cannot fundamentally change the age distribution 
of the population. 
But migration can affect the financial situation of pay-as-you-go-financed social 
pension insurance through various channels. This depends, among other factors, on the 
future development of the number of migrants. This can make financing easier (when 
the number of foreign new contributors exceeds the number of foreign pensioners, 
whether they stay in the receiving country or will return). But it can also make financing 
more difficult, when the number of foreign contributors is shrinking compared to the 
number of pensioners. In the long run, an always positive effect on the financial basis of 
the scheme can only take place – ceteris paribus –, if the system dependency ratio is 
always lower compared to a situation without migration. 
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Regarding the system dependency ratio, the following factors, among other things, are 
relevant: 
– age structure, 
– labour force participation rate, 
– disability probability, 
– retirement behaviour, 
– mortality and, in the long run, also 
– fertility, 
always in comparison to natives. 
In general – taking only the system dependency ratio into account – financing of 
pensions will be improved as long as the system dependency ratio of migrants is lower 
than this ratio for natives.  
Up to now, only the number of contributors and pensioners was taken into 
consideration. If there is an earnings-related pension scheme – as in Germany –, where 
the level of individual contribution payment in one year determines also the level of 
individual pension claim accumulated in this year, not only the number of contributors 
is relevant but also the amount of earnings (this depends on the wage rates, but also on 
working time as well as on periods of unemployment). Therefore, beside the system 
dependency ratio also the ratio of average pension benefits to average contribution 
payment is relevant for financing (Overview 15).26 
Will the earnings level of new immigration cohorts go down over time, compared to 
former immigrant cohorts? This seems to be the case in Germany, because up to 1990 
foreign employees earned on average as much as Germans, while since then the 
employment and income situation has continuously deteriorated.27 Will the spells of 
unemployment of migrants be larger compared to natives? If so, this will, for example, 
burden not only unemployment insurance in Germany because of paying unemployment 
benefits, but as well because of contribution payments in favour of unemployed persons 
for some pension claims. But these contribution payments are on average lower than 
those from gainful employment. Therefore, higher unemployment rates affect the 
financing situation of the pension insurance negatively. 
If we look at the development of individual pension benefits over time, the earnings 
level of migrants has further effects, because one factor for the development of pension 
benefits in Germany is the growth rate of average gross earnings of all insured persons. 
                                                 
26 The average contribution payment – by the way – depends on the contribution rate and average 
gross earnings of employees but also on average contribution paid in favour of unemployed 
persons by unemployment insurance. Things become even more complex if a longitudinal view is 
used compared to a cross sectional view focused on the financial conditions in one year. Here, for 
example, the number of children of immigrants, their integration into the labour market, their 
earnings – always compared to the parents cohort – are relevant.  
27 Mika and Tucci (2006: 27). 
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If this growth rate is reduced because earnings of migrants are below average and if the 
share of migrants in all contributors increases, this has ceteris paribus negative effects 
on the development of pension benefit for all pensioners due to a lower pension 
adjustment rate.28 
The German social insurance pension benefit is mainly based on years of insurance and 
former earnings. Therefore, the integration into the labour market is decisive for 
individual pension benefits. Meanwhile, immigrants who came as guest workers long 
ago, now are pensioners, many of them still living in Germany. It is, therefore, 
interesting to compare old-age pensions of natives and persons with “migration 
background” living in Germany. Beside native Germans, two groups of immigrants 
from outside the EU are included in the following Overview 16: 
(1) Ethnic Germans who are – as already mentioned – treated in the German 
pension scheme, as if they always had belonged to this scheme29 and  
(2) immigrants from Turkey and former Yugoslavia, who are the biggest groups of 
foreign nationals from outside the EU. 
Overview 16: Old-age pensions of Germans and Immigrants – Retirement 2003 – 
 Germans 
(ethnic 
Germans not 
included) 
Immigrants 
with 
nationality 
from Turkey 
and (former) 
Yugoslavia 
Ethnic 
Germans 
Average pension payment1) per month 
 
Average age of first contribution payment 
 
Last year before retirement 
Average gross earnings per month 
 
 
Share of persons with covered employment
Share of persons with   
unemployment benefit or assistance 
796 €  
(100.0 %) 
17 
 
 
1 976 € 
(100.0 %) 
 
23.8 % 
 
21.6 % 
643 €  
(80.8 %) 
29 
 
 
1 496 € 
(75.7 %) 
 
17.8 % 
 
43.0 % 
749 €  
(94.1 %) 
 
 
 
1 651 € 
(83.6 %) 
 
27.9 % 
 
24.6% 
1) Gross pension benefit minus own contribution payment für health and long-term care 
insurance  
Source: Mika and Tucci (2006), Table 2, 3, 4, 6 and own calculations. 
                                                 
28 Here, it is assumed that an increasing percentage of the working population with low earnings 
does not cause an upwards tendency in earnings for natives so that the growth rate of average 
earnings will not be changed because of low-paid migrants. There are further effects that are 
discussed in Schmähl (1995). 
29 Details and changes in the rules are not mentioned here. 
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On average, old-age pensions of ethnic Germans are up to now close to those of native 
Germans, while pensions for persons from Turkey and from the Balkan are clearly 
lower.30 This can depend on the number of years of insurance as well as on the wage 
level. Both factors seem to be relevant: On average, these persons started to contribute 
to the German pension scheme 12 years later than Germans.31 It is not documented here, 
whether they have pension claims from their home country, as well.  
Regarding wages, here only the wage of the year before claiming the pension shall be 
mentioned: Gross wages of pensioners from Turkey and the Balkan were 24 % lower on 
average.32 However, this calculation refers only to those persons who were in fact 
employed in the year before retiring. It is, in general, remarkable that at present only a 
minority of pensioners is working until the day they claim a pension: only 23.8 % of 
native as well as ethnic Germans, and even less, namely 17.8 % of persons from Turkey 
and former Yugoslavia. And the percentage of those persons who are unemployed just 
before they retire is clearly higher for the group of people from Turkey and former 
Yugoslavia: 43 % compared to 21.6 % of native Germans and 24.6 % of ethnic 
Germans. This clearly illustrates problems for older workers on the German labour 
market.33 
Therefore, on average lower pensions of the above mentioned migrants are the result of 
a lower number of insurance years, higher unemployment and lower earnings. Many 
factors can be the reason for this, different skills but also discrimination that results in 
relatively poorly paid jobs.34 
For the period from 1995 to 2005, a recent study is comparing the wage profiles of 
natives (Germans born in Germany) to persons with a so called “migration background” 
– foreigners as well as naturalised and ethnic Germans.35 Wage profiles of persons with 
“migration background” always were lower, independent of sex and qualification 
(although differences exist between the different groups).36 Whether there will be a 
catch-up effect in the future regarding the wage level – as is reported, for example, for 
migrants in the United States37 –, will depend on many factors such as the skill-
                                                 
30 Pensions to those beneficiaries, who meanwhile left Germany, are not included. 
31 Mika and Tucci (2006: 22). 
32 Mika and Tucci (2006: 23-24).  
33 On the other hand, new – of course young and highly qualified – migrants are demanded by 
employers in Germany.  
34 Clark and York (2000).  
35 See footnote No. 9. The structure of persons with “migration background“ in 2005 was 47 % 
foreigners, 41 % naturalised and 12 % ethnic Germans. 
36 Aldashev et al. (2007). 
37 See for example Chiswick (1994: 110): “In many instances, particularly among economic 
migrants, immigrant earnings eventually come to equal (after about 15 years) and then exceed 
those of the native-born in the destination country with the same measurable characteristics. 
Presumably this arises because of their greater unmeasured characteristics, that is, a higher level 
of ability and motivation.”  
 28 
structure, the development of the labour market. This does, however, not apply to 
Germany up to now. 
Regarding firm-based pensions (here, the vesting period can also be relevant for mobile 
migrants) as well as saving for private pensions, no sufficient data have been available 
in Germany. It can, however, be assumed that income of migrants from these sources is 
on average lower than that for natives. Therefore, the political decisions taken during 
the last years in Germany regarding a severe reduction of the benefit level in social 
pension insurance will hurt migrants in particular and can increase the risk of poverty in 
old age.38 
It can be expected that in the future, the share of those persons in the German labour 
market having a “migration background” (which now is usually the “political correct” 
label in Germany) will increase – independent of the fact, how many new migrants will 
come –, because in Germany already today the share of those persons with “migration 
background” in the age group below age 25 is a quarter, while in the group below age 6 
it amounts already to one third. This obviously points at the important task to qualify 
these young inhabitants. Such a qualification is important not only from the perspective 
of the labour market, but also for giving young migrants a positive perspective, because, 
for example, the share of young criminals with “migration background” is alarming.  
6.2.2 Health sector 
In contrast to pensions, benefits in the German social health insurance scheme are 
mostly benefits in kind. If migrants stay in Germany, they have access to the same 
health services as natives. In general, one can say that there will be a positive financial 
effect in health insurance, if the revenue from immigrants exceeds benefits they receive. 
For the financing situation of health insurance, number and structure of migrants and 
institutional rules of this sector are important, such as the family structure as well as sex 
and age structure and the level of wages and pensions compared to natives beside age-
specific morbidity respectively age-specific health expenditure. This is decisive for the 
question, whether they are better risks in health insurance compared to natives or not. 
In Germany’s social health insurance, a non-working spouse – that means in fact a 
housewife – as well as children are covered without own or extra contribution 
payments. Therefore, the family structure of migrants is relevant, too. The share of 
insured family members is higher for (new) immigrants than for natives and therefore 
affects financing negatively. Its future development depends on female labour force 
participation as well as on fertility behaviour.  
As already mentioned, many immigrants are already pensioners. Pensioners up to now 
only pay half of the contribution rate to health insurance themselves, while the other 
part is paid by social pension insurance. But pensions are on average much lower than 
                                                 
38 This is discussed in Schmähl (2008). 
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wages. This applies even more to migrants. Therefore, an increasing share of pensioners 
of all contributors and in particular of migrant pensioners results in relatively lower 
contribution revenue, while on the other hand – as is well known – age-specific 
expenditure for older persons (around the age of 50) is above average.  
In order to estimate effects of immigrants on health expenditure, separate age- and sex-
specific expenditure profiles of natives and immigrants – and (regarding our topic) in 
particular of immigrants from outside the EU or Europe – are needed, but do not exist 
up to now. Whether it is adequate to assume identical profiles – as it is done in some 
simulation studies –, remains on open question.39 For the consideration of financing, the 
on average lower wages and thus contribution payments are relevant, as well: Even if 
the expenditure profiles of migrants and natives were identical, immigrants in principle 
would be a financial burden for social health insurance nevertheless because of on 
average lower earnings and pensions, assumed immigrants stay in the receiving country 
during their whole future life. 
But if the profiles are identical, and if immigrants are on average younger than the 
native population, this seems to relieve financing of the health insurance scheme. But 
this is only a snapshot. It is important, how long persons, who came at an early age into 
the country finally stay in the country. If they leave the country as long as their age-
specific expenditure is below average, this has a positive effect on the financing of 
health insurance, because benefits in kind (and this is by fare the most important type of 
benefit in German social health insurance) have in principle only to be financed as long 
as the persons stay in the country.40 But this effect holds only for persons in their 
working life. If they are pensioners and receive a social insurance pension from 
Germany, this may be different, depending on bilateral agreements with countries from 
outside the EU. “[…] migrant workers who receive a pension from their former host 
country can always return to their host country for medical treatment and are covered by 
their health insurance […] This is of particular importance as many retired migrants are 
concerned about the inadequacy of the health system of their home country […] In fact 
it seems that for this reason many migrants commute between their home and former 
host country.”41 Return migration may be even higher than statistics show, because 
migrants often have also a flat in Germany or a bank account where the pension is 
transferred to, because they want to have access to the German health system. There is, 
however, a lot of return migration after retirement – in particular by EU nationals. The 
number of migrants receiving German pensions abroad is even higher than the number 
                                                 
39 And such profiles must be based on longitudinal data to identify differences between cohorts and 
not – as mostly done – profiles based on cross-sectional data, which can give misleading results. 
40 While pensions in principle have to be exported, as already mentioned. 
41 Holzmann et al. (2005: 18). In case of bilateral agreements, a person is in principle covered by the 
health system of the country where this person lives, whether he/she is employed or retired. There 
is an exception, if the retired migrant returning to his home country receives his pension only 
from the host country. Then he is still covered in principle by his host country and not his home 
country, see Holzman et al. (2005: 17-20) for details. 
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of those persons living in Germany after retirement. This can affect health insurance 
financing, as well.  
In the German long-term care insurance – in contrast to health insurance – an important 
element beside benefits in kind are benefits in cash to persons who need care. This shall 
give them the opportunity to buy benefits in kind, i.e. services. The German government 
declared that these transfers in cash are a substitute (a “surrogate”) for benefits in kind. 
The intention was to avoid the obligation to export these benefits. As generally expected 
this decision in the law of long-term care insurance was cancelled by the European 
Court of Justice. 
In case immigrants stay in the host country for a longer time, will their morbidity and 
expenditure profile in health care – if it had differed from that of natives in the 
beginning – change over time and become more similar to that of natives?42 Empirical 
evidence on this is rare. In principle, in Germany we often find on average higher 
morbidity of immigrants, a higher number of family members without contribution 
payments, lower wages, but on average a younger population. This, however, has not 
only to be analysed for a specific year as a cross-sectional phenomenon, but over time, 
taking into account possible changes in the composition of the group of immigrants as 
well as changes over the life cycle regarding factors that are relevant for evaluating the 
question, whether immigration (in particular from outside Europe) is positive or 
negative for health care financing.  
But financing is only one dimension; only two examples shall illustrate this: 
(1) Immigrants caring for frail elderly persons. This becomes more and more important 
in countries with an ageing population. The supply of family care is shrinking due to a 
smaller number of children (smaller successive cohorts) and also increasing female 
labour force participation. Women (as wives, daughters and daughters-in-law) are 
mostly the ones providing family care. On the other hand, demand for non-residential 
care is increasing because of increasing life expectancy and high costs for residential 
care. For the majority of elderly, these costs cannot be financed from their own income 
and own assets. Female immigrants are often engaged as care persons already now, 
sometimes with a work permit but sometimes also without. The restrictions for such 
work permits are still rather tight in Germany. There will be an increasing demand for 
immigrants caring for frail elderly – and generallyfor personal services, as well.  
(2) Immigrants who did not return to their home-country not only become pensioners 
but some of them will also need long-term care in old age. Although – as in most native 
households – there is the wish to be cared for at home, in particular by the family, 
reality often makes it difficult to realise this. One specific new example is the first 
residential care facility only for older Turkish people only in Berlin,43 trying to take into 
consideration specific cultural needs, which goes much beyond language and religion. 
                                                 
42 An analysis of demographic development and health care sector can be found in Schmähl (2002).  
43 Türk Huzur Evi in Berlin-Kreuzberg. 
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There are also other attempts to take care of the needs of frail elderly migrants within 
general residential care facilities. In addition to this in Berlin – which has a high 
Turkish community – there exist, for example, also services to provide non-residential 
care specialised on Turkish people. 
All this points to the fact that long-term as well as permanent migration of migrants 
from outside the EU and outside Europe have to be taken into consideration in social 
policy and, in general, as an element of integration policy. 
6.3 Means-tested transfer payments and poverty 
Finally a look at means-tested transfer payments and at poverty. Low earnings and high 
unemployment are among the major factors for means-tested transfer payments to avoid 
poverty. The official poverty line in Germany is given by means-tested social 
assistance. If we look at different groups of the population, the share of migrants 
receiving social assistance benefits for financing one’s living differs remarkably. It is 
the highest for foreigners from outside the EU (Overview 17). In the non-EU population 
there is a considerable share of asylum seekers and tolerated migrants (who cannot be 
deported), who are forced to live on a specific means-tested scheme: Benefits are 
considerably lower than those for citizens and foreign nationals with secure residence 
status, and these benefits are often granted only in kind. In addition, these groups are 
faced with a prohibition to work or limited access to the labour market.  
Overview 17: Share of social assistance for Germans and Foreigners 2000* 
     – in per cent – 
Germans 2.78 
Foreigners 
 EU nationals 
 non-EU nationals 
8.14 
3.20 
9.85 
Total 3.25 
* Transfers in cash for financing one's living (no residential care) 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2001), Tab. 1. 
For international comparisons a standardised poverty definition is often used, for 
example based on 60 per cent of the median of net household income based on 
equivalent scales. Using this indicator, poverty of persons with nationality from non-
western countries is the highest (Overview 18). The poverty rate of migrants of age 60 
and older is remarkably high, as well. These are mainly those migrants that came to 
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Germany as guest workers and stayed in Germany.44 The finding that the poverty rate of 
the “second generation” of migrants is even one third, is also highly problematic. 
Overview 18: „Poverty rate“ of different population groups – Germany 2002 – 
 median net-income per 
month in €  
poverty rate  
of household group in %∗) 
German citizens 
 born in Germany  
 ethnic Germans  
 naturalised  
 from western countries 
 from non-western countries 
 
1 366 
1 072 
1 184 
(1 384) 
1 157 
 
13 
25 
18 
(16) 
19 
other nationality 
 western countries 
 non-western countries  
1 057 
1 347 
   977 
25 
11 
32 
„second generation“ 
(below age 35)    989 33 
∗) „poverty“ = below 60% of median net-equivalent income of households of the 
specific group, OECD new equivalent scale  
Source: Tucci and Wagner (2005), Tab. 2 and own calculations. 
7 Some tentative concluding remarks 
As already mentioned in the beginning, no general answer is possible regarding the 
effects of migration on social security.45 They depend on a great variety of factors 
including the characteristics of immigrants, the institutional design of social security 
schemes as well as the economic situation in countries.46 This is also relevant when 
focusing on migrants from outside the EU. All these factors can change over time. 
Statistical snapshots based on cross sectional data may be highly misleading regarding 
benefits and costs of migration, even if they are only focused on social security. 
Longitudinal data are additionally necessary to see, for example, whether cohort-
specific differences exist and to take a lifecycle perspective into consideration, as well.  
                                                 
44 Tucci and Wagner (2005: 81). 
45 There may be also different preferences in different countries regarding migrants and, therefore, 
the evaluation of costs and benefits may differ.  
46 Regarding the impact of migration on social security, the situation and conditions of Germany 
were taken as an example in this paper. It is not intended to generalise findings, but the examples 
point at several important factors and elements of the “welfare state regime”. A more general 
approach comparing different “immigration regimes” and “welfare state regimes” is in Chorny et 
al. (2007). The effects of immigration policy in particular on immigrant composition and labour 
market integration of immigrants are discussed in numerous papers. In Euwals et al. (2007) this is 
discussed for Germany and the Netherlands regarding Turkish immigrants.   
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It is obvious that a broad approach is necessary when trying to evaluate past migration 
as well as possible effects of future migration. Effects will also depend on migration 
policy of the EU as well as on the national conditions of migrant-receiving countries, 
but also on the economic and political development in migrant-sending countries.47 It is 
important to improve the conditions of second-generation immigrants who are already 
in the country, and to develop the potential input migrants can have for economy and 
society and to make use of this potential.48 As one precondition, the heterogeneity of 
migrants has to be taken carefully into consideration. 
Whether a strategy of temporary working- and temporary residence-permits (like 
Green- or Blue-cards) is a successful or optimal strategy, may be questioned. There 
seems to be some empirical evidence that a short-time perspective regarding migrants 
has negative effects on investment in economic and social human capital of migrants 
and may have negative effects on integration. Among this, it can affect attitudes and 
behaviour of children in migrant families, as well.49 Looking back at the past 
experiences with intended short-term employment of migrants and the fact that many of 
them stayed longer or even permanent, but often made only little investment in 
economic and social human capital, which has negative effects on income (also income 
in old age), this should be taken into consideration by decision makers in designing an 
immigration policy that aims at selecting immigrants mainly for a limited number of 
years.50 If it is argued that immigration is necessary for economic reasons and for fiscal 
sustainability of social security, the costs of immigration and of necessary integration 
should also be compared, for example, to the costs of activities to integrate existing 
older workers into the labour market, in particular by necessary retraining. In principle, 
an attempt for a broad-based analysis is necessary everywhere, and short-sightedness 
should be avoided. Realising this could be an important precondition for responsible 
political and economic decisions that benefit natives as well as migrants.  
                                                 
47 There is a lack of information regarding the interaction of economic motives for migration and the 
design of migration policy, which would be important to improve our understanding of the 
processes resulting in migration. See for example Schmidt (2002: 185). 
48 Regarding the resources of migrants, in particular older migrants, see in detail Altenbericht 
(2006), chapter 8.  
49 See for example Dustmann (2002). 
50 Such an immigration policy based on selection would, however, change the structure of the 
population with “migration background” in Germany only in the medium and long term (Brücker 
and Ringer 2008: 7) and would depend on how much migration processes can in fact be designed 
according to such criteria.  
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